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This paper uses a data set covering 9 EU15 member states and 7 candidate countries and
new member states to compare inter-regional migration patterns in the 1990s. We find
that the level of migration is lower in candidate countries and new member states than in
EU15 member states. Also in contrast to the EU15 member states, migration has fallen in
candidate countries and new member states. This casts doubt on the viability of migration
as an adjustment mechanism. Estimating place-to-place models of migration we find that
migration is less reactive to regional disparities in candidate countries and new member
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lar to EU15 states, net migration should increase by a factor of between 2 and over 10.
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1 Introduction
The stylized fact of low migration rates in Europe has
been repeatedly documented. Decressin/Fatas
(1995), Fatas (2000), Obstfeld/Peri (2000) and
Puhani (2001) find that migration contributes only
moderately to the reduction of differences in regional
labor market conditions in European Union (EU)
member states. Recent evidence suggests that migra-
tion is an even less efficient mechanism for equili-
brating regional labor markets in candidate countries
and new member states. Fidrmuc (2004) finds that
overall internal mobility in the new EU member
states is low and inefficient at reducing regional dis-
parities. Ederveen/Bardsley (2003) find that migrants
in the candidate countries and new member states are
less responsive to regional wage and employment
disparities than is the case in EU15 member states,
and Drinkwater (2003) reports that the willingness to
migrate across regions and national borders is at the
lower end of the distribution among European coun-
tries. Cseres-Gergeley (2002), Hazans (2003), Kallai
(2003) and Fidrmuc/Huber (2003) provide case stud-
ies on Hungary, the Baltics, Romania and the Czech
Republic to provide further evidence on low migra-
tion rates in candidate countries and new member
states.
The potential economic and political consequences
of this lack of labor mobility have been repeatedly
stressed. Low internal migration increases mismatch
unemployment and will thus contribute to high na-
tion-wide unemployment (Boeri/Scarpetta 1996).
Aside from causing social problems, this may also
have political implications. In the long run higher un-
employment rates may lead to increased demands for
regional transfers. This in turn may cause dissatisfac-
tion on the side of those parts of the population fi-
nancing regional transfers and may lead to the disin-
tegration of political unions.1 Furthermore, lack of
migration impinges on the short-run adjustment ca-
pabilities of regional labor markets to asymmetric
shocks (Eichengreen 1998). Lacking migration may
thus also hamper the viability of monetary unions.
Since exchange rate fluctuations are impossible in
monetary unions, the absence of migration results in
adjustment to asymmetric shocks through wages, un-
employment or participation rates. To the extent that
these adjustment mechanisms are socially or politi-
cally less desirable than migration, low migration
rates will result in social and political costs from the
EMU (Fidrmuc 2003).
Despite these profound implications, little is known
about the causes of low migration in Europe. A num-
ber of explanations have been put forward to account
for this puzzle, such as inefficiencies in spatial
matching (Faini et al. 1997), the effects of social
transfers on the search incentives of the unemployed
(Fredriksson 1999), housing market imperfections
(Cameron/Muellbauer 1998) and cultural differences
as reflected for instance in attitudes towards risk
(Bentivogli/Pagano 1999). A final verdict on which
of these factors is decisive, however, has not been
reached.
In this paper we use data on inter-regional migration
in the 1990s for nine EU15 member states and seven
countries that either joined the EU in 2004 or are ne-
gotiating membership, in order to compare regional
migration patterns. Our goals are twofold. First, we
explore the stylized facts of migration in candidate
countries and new member states and compare them
with EU15 member states. In the next section we thus
describe migratory moves in the two regions. We
highlight a number of differences in migration pat-
terns. Inter-regional migration in particular is low by
EU15 standards in candidate countries and new
member states and fell throughout the 1990s. A
smaller share of migration is accounted for by per-
sons of working age and in both regions around 90%
of all measured migration flows are churning flows,
which contribute little to the equilibration of aggre-
gate regional disparities. We also present evidence
that a substantial part of migration covers only short
distances and that migration rates are strongly corre-
lated over time. This suggests that migration presents
a rather protracted and sluggish adjustment mecha-
nism to regional disparities. 
Second, we compare the responsiveness of migration
to regional income and labor market disparities by es-
timating place-to-place models of migration. We esti-
mate a model suggested by Bentivogli/Pagano
(1999), incorporating risk aversion in section three.
In contrast to earlier comparative work, this allows us
to estimate directly the elasticity of migration with
respect to regional income and employment rate dis-
parities in both EU15 member states and candidate
countries and new member states. We find that both
net and gross migration are less reactive to regional
employment rate and income disparities in the candi-
date countries and new member states and that atti-
tudes towards risk play a minor role, but geographic
factors a major role in determining migration. We al-
so show that net migration should increase by a factor
of between 2 and 10 in the candidate countries and
new member states if it were as responsive to region-
al disparities as it is in Spain, Italy or the Nether-
1 For example Fidrmuc/Horvath/Fidrmuc (1999) argue that lacking
regional mobility was one of the economic causes for the disinte-
gration of Czechoslovakia.ZAF 4/2004 395
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lands. Section four finally concludes the paper by
drawing some policy conclusions and outlining po-
tential directions for further research.
2S tylized facts
We use internal migration data for the 1990s on nine
European Union countries namely Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden and the UK, and seven countries which have
either completed negotiations for membership or are
still negotiating accession namely the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and
Romania. All data were taken from Eurostat’s Cronos
database. As shown in Table 1 these data vary in
scope and content. In particular, the data refer to dif-
ferent regional units in different countries. For most
countries the data refer to NUTS II regions, but for
Denmark, Estonia and Slovenia, data are available
only at the NUTS III level, while in Germany and the
UK they only cover NUTS I regions. These differ-
ences in regional disaggregation imply substantial
differences in region size. For instance, the largest
territories in terms of average population are the Ger-
man and UK NUTS I regions and the smallest re-
gions are the NUTS III regions of Slovenia, Estonia
and Denmark. Average size also varies considerably
for regional units at the same level of regional disag-
gregation. In terms of population the largest NUTS II
regions are in Italy, with 2.9 million inhabitants, and
the smallest in Austria, with 898,000.2
The data also differ with respect to the time period
covered.3 For Germany for instance data are only
available up to 1993 and in Slovakia only the year
2These differences in size could be a problem for empirical results,
because one would expect measured migration to increase with de-
creasing region size. The new member states and candidate coun-
tries (with the exception of Slovenia and Estonia) are by and large
comparable with the EU15 member states in this respect, however.
Furthermore, to the degree that the regions of the new member sta-
tes and candidate countries are smaller than those of the EU15
member states we would expect higher rather than lower migration
rates. Finally, in previous research (Huber 2004) we show that av-
erage region size is a less important determinant of internal migra-
tion rates relative to other institutional variables.
3 For a number of EU member states data are available going as far
back as the 1970s. We limit our analysis to the 1990s to provide for
similar time periods for current EU15 member states and candidate
countries. 396 ZAF 4/2004
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2000 is available. Thus in an attempt to maximize the
available information, we conduct our descriptive
analysis for two sample years: 1992 and 1999.4 We
depart from this rule only in the cases of Poland,
where we report data from 1990 instead of 1992, and
for Slovakia where data from the year 2000 are taken
instead of 1999. Furthermore, most of the data col-
lected are place-to-place data. For two countries (Ro-
mania and Slovakia), however, place-to-place infor-
mation is not available.5 Thus we cannot conduct an
analysis at the same depth for these countries.
2.1 Net and gross migratory moves
In Table 2 we report the number of migrants chang-
ing their region of residence as a percentage of the
country’s population in 1992 and 1999 respectively.
This indicator has been used as a measure of overall
mobility by a number of authors (e.g. Fatas 2000,
Faini et al. 1997, Bentolila 1999). Formally, it can be












where GF stands for gross migration flows as a share
of the total population, Oi and Mi are the migrant out-
flows and inflows from region i respectively, and
POPi is the population of region i. 
Gross migration may, however, be a misleading indi-
cator, because a substantial part of migration is ac-
counted for by churning flows, where people move in
and out of the same region.7 Most macroeconomic
models, which regard migration as an equilibrating
mechanism in the face of regional disparities, focus
on net migration. Thus measures of net migration
should capture better the efficiency of inter-regional
migration flows in equilibrating regional disparities
in unemployment and income. This can be measured
as the sum absolute values of the difference between
emigration and immigration across regions. In the
notation of equation (1) net migration flows as a
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The results of this decomposition (see Table 2) do not
suggest that migration is a viable mechanism for re-
gional adjustment in Europe. Although there is some
variance across countries, migration is low in EU15
member states and even lower in candidate countries
and new member states. In the average EU15 mem-
ber state around 1% of the population changes region
of residence during one year. Gross migration rates
are substantially lower than 1% only in Italy and
Spain. In the candidate countries and new member
states gross migration rates exceed the 1% mark only
in Romania and Hungary and are around or below
0.5% in most countries.
Furthermore, in contrast to the EU15 member states,
where gross migration has stagnated or even in-
creased over the period from 1992 to 1999, migration
rates have fallen in all candidate countries and new
member states for which we have data for both time
periods. This finding is consistent with a number of
results reported by other authors researching migra-
tion patterns in the candidate countries and new
member states (Kallai 2004, Hazans 2004, Fidr-
muc/Huber 2004) but stands in stark contrast to the
increase in regional disparities found in much of the
literature on regional development (Egger/Huber/
Pfaffermayr 2004, Petrakos 1995, Huber/Palme
2001, Gorzelak 1996), which suggests that regional
divergence predominated in the last decade in the
candidate countries and new member states and thus
incentives to migrate should have increased rather
than decreased.
The low effectiveness of migration at reducing re-
gional disparities is underlined by the net migration
4 We performed a similar analysis as below for other years as well
as for data at different regional aggregations in earlier versions of
this paper. The results of that analysis are comparable with those
presented below and are available from the author.
5 Furthermore, in Poland data for 1990 are not place-to-place data
and the breakdown by age groups and gender presented below is
also not available on a place-to-place basis.
6 Division by two is necessary to avoid double counting since each
outflow for one region is also an inflow for another region.
7 These churning flows can be explained either by heterogeneity of
individual tastes and characteristics or regional demand for labor
(Fields 1979), or by different life-cycle positions of individuals
(e.g. students migrating to their place of education). Mueser (1997)
shows that churning may also occur among ex-ante homogenous
individuals due to endogenous wealth effects arising, for instance,
from land price increases. Finally, spatial search models (Jack-
mann/Savouri 1990, Molho 2000, Juarez 2000) predict churning as
a result of stochastic matching, if workers do not search exclusive-
ly in their region of residence. 
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rates. They rarely exceed 0.1% of the population in
the candidate countries and new member states and
haven fallen in all countries but the Czech Republic.9
In EU15 member states by contrast, net migration
flows at least approach the 0.1% level in all countries
but Austria and the Netherlands, and the evidence
concerning a decline is less ubiquitous. Thus a sub-
stantial part of migration (around 90%) in both re-
gions is due to churning flows, which contribute little
to the narrowing of aggregate regional disparities. 
2.2 Regional and demographic structure
Our data refer to population moves. This may distort
results concerning labor migration, if some migration
is undertaken for reasons other than economic activi-
ty. Examples of such migration may be students mov-
ing to their place of education or pensioners moving
to retire. Furthermore, as noted for example by
Cameron/Muellbauer (1998) migration between
neighboring regions and within urban agglomera-
tions may be motivated primarily by housing mo-
tives, if residents of one region (such as a city) move
to another (such as the suburbs) without changing
their workplace. Such migration is obviously not as-
sociated with income or unemployment disparities
between regions, but is motivated by cheaper hous-
ing, better educational infrastructure or better living
conditions in the receiving region. Thus it will do lit-
tle to equilibrate regional labor market disparities,
since the effective labor supply remains unchanged in
both the sending and the receiving region.
9 Interestingly the increase in net migration in the Czech Republic
is primarily due to the increase in migration from Prague to its en-
virons (see: Fidrmuc/Huber 2003).398 ZAF 4/2004
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While with our data it is impossible to gauge the ex-
act extent of such migration which is not motivated
by labor-market factors, some indication is available.
First, for a number of countries we have available mi-
gration by age groups and gender.10 This allows us to
estimate the share of the working-age population
(aged between 20 and 64) in total migration i.e., of
those that at least theoretically could move for labor
market reasons. These data (see Table 3) suggest that
the share of the working-age population in total mi-
gration is slightly lower in most candidate countries
and new member states than in the EU15. In typical
candidate countries and new member states, between
65% and 70% of the migrants are of working age
(with the outliers being Romania with 74% and Esto-
nia with around 58%). In the member states by con-
trast typically more than 70% of the migrants are of
working age. The only indicator where candidate
countries and new member states have higher figures
than EU15 member states is the share of female mi-
grants. More than half of the migrants in candidate
countries and new member states are female. This
may in part be explained by the higher participation
rate of females in many candidate countries and new
member states, leading to more labor-motivated mi-
gration among women.
Furthermore, for the countries where place-to-place
data are available we can calculate the share of
moves between neighboring regions as an indication
of the relevance of short-distance moves, which are
not associated with labor market motives. Shares of
migration between neighboring regions may, howev-
er, be influenced by differences between countries as
regards their geography, which may in turn lead to
differences in the number of neighbor relationships
and thus may influence the share of migration be-
tween neighboring regions. In column 3 of Table 4
we thus calculated the share of contingency relation-
ships in a country.11 Comparing this share with the
share of migration between neighboring regions
gives an indication of the extent to which the share of
short-distance moves between neighboring regions
10 Unfortunately, the data on the age and gender of migrants is not
available on a place-to-place basis.
11 This is calculated by observing that in a country with n regions
there are n*(n-1) pairs of sending and receiving regions (since mi-
gration within a region is not measured). If m of these pairs are
contingent, the share of contingency relationships in the total num-
ber of pairs of sending and receiving regions is given by 
s = ––m ––––
n(n–1)
–.ZAF 4/2004 399
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exceeds the rate expected if migration were inde-
pendent of distance. According to these statistics,
flows between neighboring regions exceed their ex-
pected value by a factor of between 1.2 and 3.0. Thus
a substantial part of migration in both candidate
countries and new member states as well as EU15
member states is accounted for by short-distance
moves.12
Further doubt concerning the viability of migration as
a mechanism for equilibrating regional disparities
comes from correlating net migration rates (as a per-
centage of the resident population in a region) over
time periods. These correlations are usually high and
significant (see column 4 of Table 4). The correlation
coefficients of net migration rates between regions at
two points in time seven years apart are highly signif-
icant in all countries and may reach levels of up to
0.9. As recently pointed out by Rappaport (1999) this
suggests that migration is not reactive to transitory
shocks but reflects either the protracted adjustment to
permanent shocks or differences in the steady state
growth paths among regions. 
2.3 Internal and external migration
Our data also exclusively measure internal migration.
A number of recent papers, however, suggest that in-
ternational and intra-country migration may be sub-
stitutes (Borjas 1999). If migrants from abroad are
more likely to move to places with high wages and
low unemployment rates, this may deter national mi-
grants from moving to these places. Alternatively if
potential emigrants in depressed regions are faced
12 Furthermore, the limited evidence available suggests that long-
distance moves declined more strongly in candidate countries be-
tween 1992 and 1999. In both Hungary and the Czech Republic
moves covering a distance of more than 100 km were 18% below
their 1992 level, moves covering a distance of less than 100 km
were 10% below the 1990 level.400 ZAF 4/2004
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with a choice of moving to less depressed regions in
their own country or abroad, the choice may be to
move abroad if these regions offer even better condi-
tions than regions at home. 
Again this claim can be analyzed at least for a subset
of countries in our data, for which we have available
information on net external migration from the same
data set. The information displayed in Table 5 sug-
gests a low potential for this explanation. Although
most candidate countries and new member states (ex-
cept for Estonia) are net receiving countries for inter-
national migrants, the share of migrants received
tends to be low. Similarly, emigration abroad does
not seem to be a viable alternative to migration with-
in a country. Most of the candidate countries and new
member states for which data are available have
gross external migration rates that are equal to the
lower end of the EU15 distribution.13
Finally regional data suggest that rather than being
substitutes, international migration is complementary
to internal migration. Regions with high net immigra-
tion into the country also tend to be regions with high
levels of emigration abroad. The correlation coeffi-
cient between the two is 0.45. Thus, it seems unlikely
that high international migration rates compensate
for low internal migration in candidate countries and
new member states.
3 Estimating place-to-place models
of migration
Descriptive statistics thus suggest that migration
rates in the candidate countries and new member
states are low even relative to EU15 figures and have
fallen in the last decade. Furthermore, they indicate
that a larger share of migration is accounted for by
population moves not associated with labor market
motives and that migration is highly auto-correlated.
While this indicates that migration may be ineffective
at reducing labor market disparities, it does not pro-
vide us with quantitative estimates. We therefore esti-
mate a model of place-to-place migration to quantify
differences in the responsiveness of migration to re-
gional disparities. To motivate our choice of specifi-
cation, we consider a model proposed by Ben-
tivogli/Pagano (1999). In this overlapping genera-
tions model, agents are assumed to live for two peri-
ods. At the beginning of the first period they decide
whether they would like to live in their region of birth
(labeled h) or whether they would prefer migration to
13 This is also due to restrictive immigration regulations in EU
member states, which are the primary destination countries for
emigrants from candidate countries.ZAF 4/2004 401
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another region (called a) within the country. After
this decision has been made, in their first period of
life agents are consumers in their chosen region of
residence and either work receiving income of wt,
which is drawn from a normal distribution with mean
 i and variance  i (with i an index for the region of
residence i.e. i {a,h},) or are registered as non-em-
ployed and receive an income from the informal sec-
tor of b, which is assumed to be constant across all re-
gions. Finally, in their second period of life agents re-
tire and use their savings for consumption.
If at the beginning of the first period agents decide to
migrate from their region of birth they incur migra-
tion costs, denoted by  ah. Bentivogli/Pagano (1999)
show that under the assumption that  ah is uniformly
distributed in the interval [p,z] with z-p=1 (where p
depends on the relative attractiveness of regions as
well as the costs of migration) among agents, the
share of a region’s population moving from region h
to a at time t (maht) can be written as:




2) – pah (4)
with   a function of the interest rate, and   the ab-
solute risk aversion coefficient and uit and  it indica-
tors of labor market tightness and the variance of re-
gional income, respectively. 
In empirically implementing equation (4) we include
fixed effects to control for time invariant characteris-
tics of regions such as amenities as well as psycho-
logical and financial costs associated with migration,
and focus directly on net migration rates.14 In partic-
ular we perform two estimations. First we reformu-
late equation (4) as:
1n(maht) =  1n( at– ht) –  1n(uat+uht) +
 1n( at
2– at




øah +  
t
 t +  aht (5)
where øah is a set of Jx(J-1) fixed effects for each pair
of sending and receiving regions. These are included
to control for all aspects of moving costs between
two regions, e.g. the differences in regional ameni-
ties, the distance to be covered, contingency effects,
differences in relationships between urban and subur-
ban regions, and potential cultural differences within
regions of countries that may increase psychological
moving costs.  t are fixed effects for each time peri-
od. These are included as a proxy for macroeconomic
influences on migration behavior, e.g. changes in the
social welfare system or changes in the level of un-
employment rates (Decressin 1994) and  aht is the er-
ror term.
Second, as a check for robustness we also run a spe-
cification of the form 
1n(maht) =  1n( at– ht) –  1n(uat+uht) +
 1n( at
2– at
2) +  
a
 a +  
h 
 h +  
t
 t +  aht (6)
where  a and  h are fixed effects of the sending and
receiving regions respectively. Relative to the speci-
fication in equation (5) this has the advantage that
less of the variance in the migration rate is explained
by fixed effects, but has the disadvantage that the
dummies are only proxies for region-specific factors
such as regional amenities, and not for factors influ-
encing travel costs between two regions.15
Finally, several authors suggest different measures of
labor market tightness in the specification of equa-
tions (5) and (6). Jackman/Savouri (1992) use vacan-
cy rates in addition to unemployment rates, Juarez
(2000) uses employment growth or employment
rates, and Fields (1979) favors unemployment rates.
Unfortunately comparable data for all countries are
only available for employment rates (i.e. employ-
ment as a share of the resident working-age popula-
tion). Therefore we focus on this measure of labor
market tightness. Finally, as a proxy for the variabili-
ty of GDP per capita we follow Bentiviogli/Pagano
(1999) and use the standard deviation of GDP per
capita over the last three years.16We were also unable
to secure data on these variables for all countries for
the entire time period. In particular we have no data
for the UK and we lack data on GDPfor the countries
reporting at NUTS III level (i.e. Denmark, Estonia,
Slovenia) before 1995. Furthermore, for Italy and
Spain we exclude from the estimation the island
NUTS II regions of Sicily, Sardinia, the Canaries and
the Balearic Islands.17
Table 6 displays the results obtained by decomposing
the standard deviation of these explanatory variables
into a component due to the variance across sending-
receiving region pairs (the between standard devia-
tion) and into a component, due to variation across
time (the within standard deviation). The first of
these components gives some indication of the size of
14 Preference was given to net migration because we want to focus
on the potential of migration to equilibrate regional labor markets.
(Some regressions were also run for gross migration, however.
These results are available from the author upon request.) Note,
however, that using net migration we lose half of the observations
since net migration is equal (but oppositely signed) between any
pair of sending and receiving regions.
15 Indeed a specification with fixed effects of the sending and re-
ceiving regions, may be considered a restricted version of the bila-
teral fixed effects specification (Hui/Wall 2001).
16 We use the previous two years when three lags are unavailable.
17 Data on employment rates and GDP per capita for the NUTS I
and NUTS II regions were provided by Cambridge Econometrics,
for the NUTS III regions of Denmark, Estonia, and Slovenia these
data were taken from the Eurostat Cronos database.402 ZAF 4/2004
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regional disparities in the respective countries. The
table thus indicates that both regional GDP per capita
and employment rate disparities in the candidate
countries and new member states are by and large
comparable with those in most EU15 member states.
Furthermore, the table shows that the within variance
of our dependent variables is rather low. This would
lead us to expect that a large share of the variance in
regression (5) can be explained by fixed effects and
thus supports our attempt to check for robustness of
results excluding bilateral fixed effects.
Table 7 presents the results of the regression with bi-
lateral fixed effects. It suggests that net migration
rates respond moderately to economic variables in
the EU15 member states. For most of the EU15 coun-
tries analyzed (all but Italy and Denmark) we find a
significant or at least marginally significant impact of
regional per capita income disparities on migration.
Furthermore, for some of the countries (Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain) the coefficients of employ-
ment rate disparities are significant or on the verge of
significance. For Belgium, however, we obtain a very
robust positive and significant coefficient, which
suggests that in Belgium migration occurred from re-
gions with high employment rates to regions with
low employment rates. Coefficients of the differences
in the variability of GDP by contrast attain signifi-
cance only in the case of the Netherlands. This sug-
gests that in contrast to the more distant migration an-
alyzed in Bentivogli/Pagano (1999) risk aversion
plays only a minor role in the decision to migrate
within a country. 
For the candidate countries and new member states,
we find that per capita GDP differences are signifi-
cant and with the expected sign only for Hungary. For
Poland and Slovenia they are significant but have an
unexpected sign, suggesting that migrants move from
high income to low income regions in these coun-
tries. For all the other countries GDP differences re-
main insignificant. Furthermore, differences in em-
ployment rates are significant and with the expected
sign only for Slovenia, and significant but with an
unexpected sign for Hungary. These results thus sug-
gest that migration in the candidate countries and
new member states is somewhat less responsive to re-
gional income disparities than in EU15 member
states.
The most robust result for both candidate countries
and new member states and EU15 member states is,
however, that bilateral fixed effects explain the ma-
jority of the variation in gross place-to-place migra-ZAF 4/2004 403
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tion. R2 values after including GDP differentials, em-
ployment rate differentials and differences in GDP
variation mostly increase by 1 to 2 percentage points
relative to a specification with only bilateral fixed ef-
fects. This suggests that a substantial part of gross
migration in both the EU15 countries and candidate
countries and new member states is driven by factors
other than economic motives.
For this reason we also estimated equation (6) using
fixed effects of the sending and receiving regions.18
The results (see Table 8) reconfirm many of the pre-
vious findings. In particular net migration in most
EU15 member states is significantly correlated with
regional per capita GDP disparities but insignificant-
ly correlated with these disparities in candidate coun-
tries and new member states. As before we obtain
18 We also performed a number of robustness checks for this re-
gression. In particular we excluded the differences in GDPvariabi-
lity, and experimented with specifications including distance be-
tween sending and receiving regions, as well as lagged variables to
reduce potential endogeneity (see Table A1 in the appendix). None
of this changes the qualitative results.404 ZAF 4/2004
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significant coefficients with an unexpected sign in a
number of candidate countries and new member
states as well as Belgium, and differences in the vari-
ation of GDP are also insignificant as a rule in both
EU15 member states and candidate countries and
new member states. Including fixed effects of the
sending and receiving regions, however, increases
the size of the estimated parameter in a number of
countries and reduces the R2 values of the regres-
sions. As before, however, dummy variables still ex-
plain a substantial part of the variation of net migra-
tion. 
3.1 A decomposition
We thus conclude that migration is less responsive to
regional disparities in candidate countries and new
member states than in most EU15 member states,
where the most important difference is the lower re-
sponsiveness of candidate-country and new member
state migration to disparities in per capita GDP lev-
els. To quantify the effect of these differences on mi-
gration in the candidate countries and new member
states relative to the EU15 we perform a decomposi-
tion, in which we estimate the increase in net migra-ZAF 4/2004 405
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tion that would occur if the responsiveness of migra-
tion to regional disparities were as high as in one of
the EU15 member states. 
Formally, this can be done by denoting a and b as es-
timates of the coefficients of income and wage dis-
parities in a particular member state. The relative in-
crease in total migration in the candidate country
(new member state) (∆M) under the assumption that
the responsiveness to wage and income disparities is
equal to that in the EU15 member states, while all
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where c,  , and   are the parameters estimated from
equation (5) for the candidate countries and new
member states and aEU, bEU and cEU are the estimated
coefficients for a “benchmark” EU15 member state.
We perform this calculation for net migration using
Spain, Italy and the Netherlands as baseline EU15
member states.19 The results (in Table 9) suggest that
the lower responsiveness of migration to regional dis-
parities in the candidate countries and new member
states contributes to low internal migration. While
these calculations should be interpreted with caution
for most countries our calculations show that migra-
tion figures should more than double to reach western
European level in almost all candidate countries and
new member states and should multiply by a factor of
five to ten in a number of instances.20 Thus these cal-
culations indicate a substantially lower level of net
migration given regional disparities in new member
states and candidate countries than in most EU15
member states.
4 Conclusions
This paper used data on inter-regional migration for 9
EU15 member states and 7 countries that either
joined the European Union in 2004 or are negotiating
membership, in order to compare regional migration
patterns in these countries. Our most important re-
sults are first that inter-regional migration is low by
EU15 standards in candidate countries and new
member states and fell throughout the 1990s, and
second that the responsiveness of migration to re-
gional disparities is substantially lower in the mem-
ber states than in the EU15. We predict that in a typi-
cal candidate country (new member state) net migra-
tion should increase by a factor of between 2 and
more than 10 if the responsiveness of migration to re-
gional disparities were comparable with that in the
member states.
The findings thus suggest that low migration rates are
one of the major obstacles to the equalization of re-
gional disparities as well as to the effective absorp-
tion of asymmetric shocks in the candidate countries
and new member states. On the policy side this clear-
19 This choice was guided by an attempt to use countries both from
the north of the EU, with their relatively low aggregate unemploy-
ment rates and greater labor market flexibility and from the south,
where unemployment rates are somewhat higher and labor market
flexibility is lower.
20 Estimations conducted with gross migration rates suggest some-
what more modest differences: gross migration should be between
10% and 50% higher in candidate countries and new member sta-
tes if the reaction of migration to regional disparities were similar
to Spain, Italy or the Netherlands. Extreme increases are indicated
throughout for the Czech Republic, where migration should in-
crease by a factor of between 2 and 5. Slovene gross migration by
contrast seems already to have converged to the levels of these
countries. 406 ZAF 4/2004
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ly suggests that policies designed to reduce barriers
to migration in the candidate countries and new
member states should be given a high priority. Unfor-
tunately we are unable to answer the question as to
why the responsiveness of migration is so low in the
candidate countries and new member states, which
could provide orientation as to which policies could
be most helpful in increasing migration. 
We would, however, argue that a policy framework to
address the low internal migration rates in candidate
countries and new member states should take a rela-
tively broad view on migration and should encom-
pass a multitude of factors such as housing and capi-
tal market imperfections (to overcome liquidity con-
straints), improving spatial matching and reviewing
labor market institutions (in particular employment
protection regulation). Clearly, for policy purposes it
would be interesting to know which of these factors
would be most effective at increasing the willingness
to migrate. This, however, is beyond the evidence
presented in this paper.
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